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In the Supreme Court of the Slate of Utah 
GLENN C. SHAW, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ASHLEY L. ROBISON, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
KOVO, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant, 
vs. 
FIRST MEDIA CORPORATION 
a Delaware corporation, 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the District Court of Utah County 
the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action under the receivership laws of 
Utah, involving the two equal shareholders of KOVO, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, which resulted from a dead-
lock in the management of the corporation. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After determining that a deadlock existed and ap-
pointing a receiver for the corporation, and after re-
peatedly and consistently encouraging settlement by the 
No. 
13691 
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two shareholders of their differences, the Lower Court 
ordered that the Receiver sell the corporation's assets 
to a third party notwithstanding a prior complete settle-
ment by the shareholders of their differences and their 
joint petition to dissolve the receivership. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Both of the shareholders of KOVO, Inc. seek (1) 
to have set aside the order that the Receiver sell the 
corporation's assets, and (2) a remand of this case with 
directions that the Lower Court honor the settlement 
made by the owners and dismiss the receivership under 
appropriate safeguards for the rights of all interested 
parties. In the alternative, appellants seek a determina-
tion by this Court that the contract proposed to the Court 
for approval fails in important respects to properly pro-
tect the interests of appellants and a remand of the case 
with directions that the Lower Court insure that the 
rights and interests of appellants are properly and ade-
quately protected in any contract provisions which it 
may hereafter approve. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Clearly this action involving receivership laws and 
accounting between the parties is an equity proceeding. 
19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, § 1610, p.970; West v. 
West, 16 Utah 2d 411, 403 P.2d 22 (1965). And, being 
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an equity proceeding, the rule to be followed on this ap-
peal is as stated by this Court in Reiman v. Baum, 115 
Utah 147, 203 P.2d 387 (1949): 
"In equity proceedings in this jurisdiction, this 
court reviews both law and facts . . . we review 
the record and pass on the weight and sufficiency 
of the evidence . . . we determine where lies the 
preponderance of the evidence . . . " 
To the same effect are Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 
2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970); Provo City v. Jacob sen, 111 
Utah 39, 176 P.2d 130 (1947). 
The further rule that review on appeal of equity 
proceedings 
"is in the light most favorable to the findings of 
the trial court, who heard the evidence and ob-
served the witnesses" Coombs v. Ouzounicm, 24 
Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356, 357 (1970). 
would have no application to the present case since the 
Lower Court concluded at the conclusion of the evidence, 
and all counsel agreed, that '"there is really no material 
conflict in the evidence" and "I don't have any fact issues 
to decide." (Transcript of Hearing on July 3, 1974, 
p.52). Due to the equity nature of this proceeding and 
the importance of the specific things done the Statement 
of Facts which follows is more detailed than usual. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff Glenn C. Shaw, hereinafter sometimes 
referred to as "Shaw," and the defendant Ashley L. 
Robison, hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Robison" 
are the two equal shareholders of KOVO, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, hereinafter referred to as "KOVO," which 
for many years has owned and operated radio station 
KOVO in Provo, Utah. As a result of serious differ-
ences and ill will between Shaw and Robison, the man-
agement of the station and its business affairs became 
deadlocked. This action was commenced by Shaw for 
the appointment of a Receiver and an accounting by 
Robison and the corporation. Robison counterclaimed 
for an accounting by Shaw and for damages. In addi-
tion Shaw and Robison each claimed that substantial 
personal obligations were owed by the other and each 
claimed that the other was liable for mismanagement 
and defamation. 
Although the deadlock in the management was ap-
parent soon after the action was filed, (T. May 16, 1973, 
p.7 line 22) the Lower Court was extremely reluctant 
to appoint a Receiver in view of the fact that the cor-
poration was not insolvent. (T. Aug. 31, 1973, p.7 line 
14, p. 11 line 3; T. Sept. 6, 1973, p. 59 line 24, p. 60 line 
1 and line 7, p. 61 line 5) At (the urging of the Lower 
Court an interim arrangement was worked out in April, 
1973 (T. April 24, 1973) soon after the suit was filed. 
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That arrangement failed and, again at the Lower Court's 
urging, a second interim arrangement was worked out 
(T. May 16, 1973) in an effort to avoid the necessity for 
the court to appoint a Receiver. 
Because of a continuing series of differences and 
problems further hearings were held in the Lower Court 
in late August (T.Aug. 31, 1973) and early September, 
1973 (T. Sept. 6, 1973) and a Receiver was finally ap-
pointed. (T. Sept. 6, 1973, p.68 line 22) In requesting 
that a Receiver be appointed, notwithstanding the Lower 
Court's reluctance, it was specifically urged that the 
court appoint a Receiver to provide independent manage-
ment in order to permit (1) the parties to work out a 
sale by one to the other, or (2) the sale to a third party. 
(T. Aug. 31, 1973, p.22 line 4, p.23 line 12) Even at that 
time the scope of the accounting dispute was narrowing 
(T. Aug. 31, 1973, p.9 lines 19-21) and there were signs 
that with independent management there was a possi-
bility of working out a buy-sell between the owners (T. 
Aug. 31, 1973, p.22 line 24) 
In appointing the Receiver the Lower Court granted 
him full authority "to carry on routine and usual man-
agement activities" but directed that 
"any unusual or extraordinary expense or man-
agement decision must be approved by the Court 
after notice to all interested parties and hearing 
before the Court. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"6. No property, assets or rights of the cor-
poration shall be sold or encumbered in whole or 
in part until approved by the Court after notice 
to all interested parties and hearing before the 
Court;' (R. 107; T. Sept. 6, 1973, p.71 line 20) 
The Court then restated the same guideline in more 
specific terms: 
"I have one other limitation I want to put in ex-
pressly. No sale of the business or any of the 
assets in whole or in part ivill be binding upon the 
corporation until it has . . . prior approval of the 
Court. That is the probate rule, gentlemen." (T. 
Sept. 6, 1973, p.72 line 17) (Emphasis added) 
At the conclusion of the hearing on September 6, 1973, 
after the Receiver had been selected and his appoint-
ment had been arranged, (T. Sept. 6, 1973, p.70 line 27) 
the Lower Court clearly stated, in response to counsel's 
specific inquiry, consistent with the continuing serious 
effects of the parties toward settlement and the Court's 
continuing representations to the parties that if a settle-
ment could be achieved between Shaw and Robison the 
receivership would be terminated. 
"MR STOTT: One other question if I may, 
Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
MR. STOTT: I suppose it's easier to clarify 
them now than come back again. In the event the 
agreement is arrived at between the parties in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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this matter as to the sale or purchase of the cor-
poration, I suppose at that time the receiver 
would be dissolved and we would have no problem 
as far as — 
THE COURT: Not only would you have no 
problems, but the Court would be more than 
happy to entertain that petition. I might even 
entertain that not on notice. Not quite that far, 
but I would be more than happy to see that hap-
pen. As a matter of fact, that is what I thought 
I was achieving last April. 
MR. STOTT: I assumed that was the case" 
(T. Sept. 6,1973, p. 76 line 11) (Emphasis added.) 
The Court also explicitely left the owners free to sell or 
transfer their KOVO stock to each other or to third 
parties, (T. Sept. 6, 1973, p.75 line 7) and this freedom 
was never restricted in any way thereafter. 
This very strong indication from the Court of its 
desire that the owners continue their efforts to settle 
their own dispute, and the Court's specific assurance 
that the owners would have no problem in the event of 
a settlement, in having the receivership terminated, left 
the owners and their counsel with every reason to be-
lieve that their continuing efforts at settlement, if suc-
cessful, would be honored, at least until a sale of the 
assets of the corporation had been finalized and com-
pleted. The Court's pointed and explicit encouragement 
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to the owners to settle, moreover, continued consistently 
thereafter until after such a settlement was finally ach-
ieved. Then, surprisingly, the settlement was rejected 
by the court. 
Following appointment of the Receiver there were 
further discussions regarding settlement but the lack 
of sufficient financial backing proved to be a serious 
handicap. In the meantime the Receiver, and the parties 
as well, encouraged interest from third parties to pur-
chase the radio station. Having received various offers 
to purchase, counsel for the Receiver in a hearing before 
the Court on January 24, 1974 gave a brief status report 
and then indicated: 
"we hope . . . within a very short time (to) pre-
sent to the Court . . . those (offers) we consider 
to be the highest and best offer, and to seek ap-
proval from the Court at that time to proceed 
with further negotiations and a final contract 
with the parties — the Court finds to be the high-
est and best offeror." (T. Jan. 24, 1974, p.4 line 
11) 
At that same hearing the Court characteristically en-
couraged the parties: 
"You gentlemen get together during the next re-
cess I am going to call and quit kidding your-
selves and get your pencils out and start arriving 
some way to find this fiasco up." (T. Jan. 24, 
1974, p.67 line 6) 
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On January 30, 1974 the Eeceiver petitioned the 
Court for a hearing on various purchase offers he had 
received and, following the hearing, (R. 151) for an order 
"authorizing the Eeceiver to negotiate and exe-
cute an appropriate contract of sale of the cor-
porate assets . . . " (E, 151) (Emphasis added.) 
At a hearing on the Eeceiver's Motion on February 
6, 1974 counsel for the Eeceiver explained that following 
the presentation of the offers and selection of the highest 
and best one, the Eeceiver would then request 
"that the Court authorize the receiver to proceed 
to negotiate a firm and binding contract of sale 
. . . " (T. Feb. 6, 1974, p.2 line 9) (Emphasis 
added.) 
Again at that hearing, at which Intervenor's counsel was 
present, the Court strongly encouraged settlement, which 
at that time was still being actively pursued by the par-
ties. 
"I should imagine the only matter the receiver 
would be interested in is, and is first and the one 
that would make me most happy, for the share-
holders to agree on something. The course this 
matter has taken since I reluctantly allowed you 
to get the Court involved would indicate to me 
it would be difficult to get them to agree to the 
time of day. (T. Feb. 6, 1974, p,3) 
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"I think you know, Mr. Roberts, that I don't feel 
very comfortable with a matter like this before 
me. Would there be any useful purpose served 
in Counsel getting together and arriving at what 
proposition would be to the best advantage of the 
shareholders ? 
ME, ROBERTS: Your Honor, I have ser-
iously attempted to do that by way of individual 
conversations with Counsel for both the share-
holders. My opinion is that — 
THE COURT: At least they're talking to 
each other, aren't they? 
MB. ROBERTS: The attorneysf 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, they are. Yes, they 
are. And again I am not challenging the good 
faith of anyone. 
THE COURT: Neither am I. In a matter 
of this nature there are bound to be differences 
of opinion. The whole nub of the thing is I would 
be most happy if a modus operandi could be work-
ed out or a proposal acceptable to all parties could 
be arrived at without the interest of the Court. 
MR. ROBERTS: I would be most pleased if 
we could do that, Your Honor." (T. Feb. 6, 1974, 
p.4) 
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The Court further said 
"My concern is to try to see to it that whoever 
submits the offer that the Court accepts will be 
that which is acceptable to Mr. Martineau and his 
client and Mr. Stott and his client. You under-
stand that this is not *a liquidating receivership. 
MR. HARDY: / understand. (T. Feb. 6, 
1974, p.10 line 21) (Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Hardy, the attorney representing the Intervenor, 
FMC, was as noted, present throughout the hearing on 
February 6, 1974. 
At the conclusion of that hearing the Court instruct-
ed the Receiver to study the offers and make a recom-
mendation to the Court. On February 21, 1974 the Re-
ceiver recommended the FMC offer over the equivalent 
offer of Robison and the superior offer of Shaw, (R. 170, 
171) as a matter of equality of treatment of the two 
shareholders. (R. 171). On February 22,1974 the Court 
accepted "the report and recommendation of the re-
ceiver" and directed that the receiver 
"proceed to accept the offer of F.M.C., Inc., and 
proceed with all reasonable dispatch to conclude 
sale to the offeror." (R. 173) 
It was understood by the Receiver and his counsel that 
the Court intended by this order not to create a binding 
contract but only to give FMC an exclusive opportunity 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to negotiate further with the Receiver. The Receiver, for 
example, testified: 
UQ. Wasn't that letter that you received 
initially from FMC after the Court's order of 
February 22nd used merely as the basis for nego-
tiation of a definite contract? 
A. I assumed that these offers were to be 
presented to the Court, the Court would then 
make its decision as to which offer it would re-
commend, and then proceedings would be had 
from that point on to conclude a contract. 
Q. You understand the Court's order would 
be merely that one of these offers would be select-
ed so further negotiations could be had? 
A. When a contract was finished, then the 
Court would approve that contract. 
Q. Yes, that would be presented to the Court 
before it became finalized? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is what is before the Court now in 
connection with your motion that Mr. Greene just 
mentioned, isn't that true? 
A. That is what I understand. 
Q. And you have never told FMC that they 
had a contract have you? 
A. Well, I think that goes ivithout saying. 
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Q. You have never told them that their of-
fer was accepted as such, have you? 
A. Well, I don't think I could until it was 
approved by either Mr. Roberts or the Judge. 
Q. You mean the definitive-final detailed 
contract? 
A. I left all those matters up to Mr. Roberts 
to work out. 
Q. Okay. And you expected that before it 
became final it would be approved by the Court? 
A. Yes 
Q. And that it would be executed by you" 
A. After approval of the Court? 
Q. Yes. But you haven't executed it at this 
point, have you? 
A. I don't believe I have." 
(T. June 28, 1974, p.128, 129) (Emphasis added.) 
Similarly the Receiver's counsel testified: 
"[W]hat I intended to do as counsel for the re-
ceiver was to negotiate, complete the negotiations 
of the contract along the lines of the FMC offer, 
and I understand procedurally it would be resub-
mitted to the Court for final approval. 
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THE COURT: I suppose you thought you 
were carrying out the order of February the 22nd? 
MR. ROBERTS: That is what I thought I 
was doing . . . procedurally J understand there 
would have to be further approval by the Court." 
(T. June 28, 1974, p.137 line 5-12, 16-17) (Em-
phasis added.) 
Counsel's letter dated February 27, 1974 advising Mr. 
Hardy for FMC that the Receiver's recommendation of 
the FMC offer shows a similar understanding of the 
Court's order. He there requested 
"would you kindly, therefore, submit to me the 
draft contract so that we may proceed as soon as 
possible to negotiate all final terms and finalize 
the matter. (R. 314) (Emphasis added.) 
In connection with a general objection to the Receiver's 
report and the Court's order of February 22, 1974 ap-
proving the Receiver's recommendations counsel for 
Robison filed an objection on March 7, 1974 (R. 177) in 
which he complained that "the acceptance of any offer 
to sell the assets of KOVO, Inc. . . . is premature." (R. 
177). At a hearing on that objection on March 15, 1974 
the Court assured counsel for Mr. Robison and the 
parties that he considered the FMC letter offer of Janu-
ary 15, 1974 (R, 141) to be merely an offer to negotiate 
and the basis for negotiation and not an acceptance of 
as an offer or a sale as such. (T. June 28,1974, p.6 line 
2) 
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Although it was indicated in the Minute Entry 
that the hearing was reported, for some unexplained rea-
son no record of it could be found. An affidavit from 
Attorney Stott, confirming the statement of Shaw's coun-
sel to the Court, not disputed by the Court, as to what 
occurred at that hearing, as noted in the last record re-
ference above was, suprisingly, not admitted by the 
Court, but was left in the record as a proffer of proof. 
(R. 311) Suffice it to say, there is no dispute that such 
assurances was given by the Court at that time a con-
siderable time after the court's February order. Further, 
Intervenor is charged with notice of that proceeding and 
the Court's assurances given there which were consistent 
with his assurances given September 6, 1973. 
In all events, the parties relied upon that assurance 
by the Court, which was in all respects consistent with 
their understanding that they had a continuing right to 
settle their differences if they could. (T. June 28, 1974, 
p.6 lines 11-22) That assurance was also consistent with 
the prior and subsequent strong encouragement by the 
Court of a settlement between the parties. It is also 
consistent with the Court's order overruling Robison's 
objections dated March 27, 1974 which provided: 
"It is hereby ordered that the Objection of Ash-
ley L. Robison to the Order of this Court au-
thorizing the Receiver to proceed to negotiate a 
sale with FMC Corporation are hereby over-
ruled and denied." (R. 182) (Emphasis added.) 
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Following the receipt by the Receiver's counsel of 
a draft of a detailed agreement of sale in March, 1974 
he furnished copies to counsel for Shaw and Robison 
and conferred with them to receive their suggestions and 
objections. Both raised serious objections to many of 
the provisions which were added to or substantially dif-
ferent from those contained in the original letter offer. 
(T. June 28, 1974, p,140; R. 378-387) Significantly, an 
extremely important and extremely harsh Escrow Agree-
ment (R. 388) which was to have been a part of the over-
all sales agreement was never furnished to counsel for 
either Shaw or Robison until late June, 1974 and only then 
because it was specifically requested. Nor did it accom-
pany the proposed contract submitted to the Court for 
approval. (R. 186-259) Nor was any form of Employ-
ment Agreement, which also was to have been a part of 
the proposed contract, ever submitted to the Court. The 
many substantial changes and additions actually pro-
posed, as well as the incompleteness of the documents 
submitted to the Court for approval demonstrated the 
very general and preliminary nature of FMC's original 
bid and the need which then remained and still remains 
for further negotiations to refine and formalize any 
binding agreement. 
Having ignored, or at least having failed to incor-
porate into the sales agreement, even the most important 
of the owners' serious objections, and having failed even 
to furnish copies of the harsh Escrow Agreement to coun-
sel or the Court, and having made no effort to discuss 
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or complete the contemplated Employment Agreements 
with Shaw and Eobison, the Eeceiver on May 13, 1974 
filed his Motion to Authorize Execution of Sales Con-
tract. (E. 186-259) The Eeceiver's Motion shows clearly 
his understanding, and that of his counsel, that even at 
that date there had been no binding contract made with 
the Intervenor. The Eeceiver properly petitioned: 
"'That the Court enter its order approving 
the execution of the document by the receiver in 
a manner which is binding upon KOVO, Inc." (E. 
186-187) (Emphasis added.) 
Eelying upon the Lower Court's continuing and de-
finite urging that it would like the parties to settle their 
differences, and its clear and specific assurance that if 
the owners' differences were resolved, it would terminate 
the receivership, the owners and their counsel continued 
to explore and narrow down the avenues of possible com-
promise. Sources of financial backing for a buy-sell ar-
rangement, at first almost wholly lacking, became con-
ditionally available. Furthermore, the negotiations con-
centrated on not only a sale of the business but a com-
plete settlement of all of the very broad and difficult 
issues, claims and differences between the parties as 
well. 
With substantial financial backing finally available, 
(T. June 7, 1974, p.10 line 4) definite proposals for set-
tlement were discussed between counsel for Shaw and 
Eobison on May 1, 1974. (T. July 3, 1974, p.10). In a 
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meeting between the owners and their counsel on May 
3, 1974 a format for settlement negotiations was worked 
out. During the ensuing ten-day period four additional 
meetings were held involving 'counsel and the parties to 
further narrow the areas of difference. (T. July 3, 1974, 
p.11-12) All of the foregoing, of course, occurred before 
the Receiver's Motion to Authorize Execution of Sales 
Contract, dated May 11, 1974 had been received. 
During the weeks of May 13th, May 20th and May 
27th further extensive negotiations were conducted which 
resulted in a resolution of the last remaining major 
problems on May 30th. (T. July 3, 1974, p.12) At that 
time counsel for the Receiver, who had previously been 
advised that negotiations were proceeding which ap-
peared to have possibilities of success, (T. July 3, 1974, 
p.17 line 22; T. June 28, 1974, p.149 line 25, p,150 line 2) 
was advised that a settlement had been achieved. At his 
request counsel for the Intervenor was advised the fol-
lowing day. (T. July 3, 1974, p. 12-13) As early as May 
24,1974 the Court had been advised that a settlement was 
in the offing as reflected by the Minute Entry to that 
effect in the file. (R. 262). 
Between May 30th and June 5th the agreement be-
tween Shaw and Robison was reduced to writing and 
finalized for all practical purposes. (T. July 3, 1974, 
p.13; Exhibit 20) Prior to the hearing on the Receiver's 
Motion, on June 5, 1974, counsel filed on behalf of Shaw 
and Robison a Motion to Terminate Receivership and 
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Discharge Eeceiver, upon the ground that, "subject only 
to approval of the Court/ ' '"ail outstanding issues have 
been resolved and settled" between Shaw and Eobison. 
(E. 266-267). The agreement was expressly conditioned 
upon approval of the Court and termination of the re-
ceivership. (Exhibit 20; T. June 28, 1974, p.156 line 23) 
In a hearing before the Court on June 7, 1974, the 
Eeceiver and his counsel took no position pro or con 
with respect to the Eeceiver?s Motion. (T. June 7, 1974, 
p.6 line 11) At that hearing the Court readily conceded 
that it had consistently and strenuously urged settlement 
(T. June 6, 1974, p.26 lines 24-30). The Court, for ex-
ample, stated: 
"The law favors settlement of differences amongst 
parties outside the judicial process. I am most 
reluctant to continue if these parties have actual-
ly settled their differences. As a matter of fact, 
I have worked harder than coumsel to try to get 
that for a year." (T. June 7, 1974, p. 20 lines 
28-30, p.21 lines 1-2) (Emphasis added.) 
Significantly, the Court observed at the conclusion of 
that hearing: 
"Now my concern is twofold. Am I bound 
when the parties, the principals in this litigation, 
have reconciled their differences? Am I bound 
by that? My inclination to answer that question 
is yes; second, does Mr. Greene's client have a 
vested right and entitled to the protection of the 
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Court? Mr. Greene has the burden of convincing 
me of that. Do you understand that, Mr. Greene f 
Those are the questions." (T. June 7, 1974, p.23 
line 1-7) (Emphasis added.) 
At a second hearing on the Receiver's Motion on 
June 28, 1974, at which the Receiver again took no posi-
tion either way on his own Motion, (T. June 28, 1974, 
p.150 line 12) the Court conceded that it had advised 
counsel at the March 15, 1974 hearing that it had intend-
ed the FMC letter offer to be merely an offer to negotiate 
as is readily apparent from the following discussion be-
tween counsel and the Court: 
"But at that hearing the Court was very explicit 
in saying that this was merely an offer to ne-
gotiate and the basis for a negotiation and not 
an acceptance of an offer or sale as such. The 
contract was entered by the Court and approved 
by the Court. I am sure we all proceeded on that 
basis. 
THE COURT: Your position simply I take 
it is analogous to a probate proceeding where the 
sale of the property is not final until it is ap-
proved by the Court, is that right? 
MR. MARTINEAU: That is r ight" 
(T. June 28, 1974, p.6 lines 7-16) 
The Court also noted again at that hearing that: 
"An overriding rule of law in this country is that 
the law favors compromises and settlement. Ap-
parently Mr. Conder and Mr. Martineau's clients 
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have compromised their differences. This is not 
a receivership that would involve the rights of 
creditors." (T. June 28, 1974, p.8 lines 19-23) 
The Court also noted, 
"I think as far as those two people (Shaw and 
Robison) are concerned they have got themselves 
in a blind. Because they have settled their dif-
ferences. 
MR. MARTINEAU: We have, Your Honor." 
(T. June 28, 1974, p.12, lines 1-4) 
At a final hearing on July 3, 1974 the following dis-
cussion occurred: 
"THE COURT: . . . I am considering the 
purpose of why the Court is in this action in the 
first instance. 
MR. MARTINEAU: The reason was there 
was a deadlock. 
THE COURT: I am aware of that. 
MR. MARTINEAU: And it couldn't be 
straightened out without assistance of the Court. 
The Court's assistance has allowed us to settle 
these problems. 
THE COURT: The only question I have at 
the present moment is whether in the process of 
doing that FMC, the intervenor, attained any 
rights. 
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MR. MARTINEAU: Well, or whether our 
rights were divested." (T. July 3, 1974, p.33-34, 
lines 3-20) 
# # * 
"THE COURT: (addressing counsel for the 
Intervenor) Of course, absent your client's posi-
tion, except for that, the Court would latch onto 
that offer (settlement between Shaw and Robi-
son) in a hurry, wouldn't it? Absent a person in 
the position of your client?" (T. July 3, 1974, 
p.39 line 26) 
* * # 
"I am not passing on the business judgment. Any-
time a plaintiff and defendant come to a settle-
ment of their differences the Court grabs onto 
that in a hurry. That gets rid of the case, doesn't 
it? 
MR. GREENE: In this kind of a case with 
this kind of background I would think not Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Except for a person in the 
position of your client. 
MR. MARTINEAU: This is an especially 
appropriate case for that very thing." (T. July 
3, 1974, p.40 line 6) 
# * * 
MR, MARTINEAU: I would say this, Your 
Honor: The Court has consistently encouraged 
us to settle. I think it has always been our under-
standing properly — 
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THE COURT: I have been trying to get you 
to either settle or appeal. 
MR. MARTINEAU: I don't want to have 
to appeal it if I don't have to, but let me say this: 
It has always been our understanding in confer-
ences with the Court and with the receiver and 
his counsel that the letter of FMC was merely a 
basis for negotiation. Any final document would 
have to be negotiated, presented to the Court, and 
approved before it become final. That is consist-
ent with all the orders and all of the motions and 
all of the proceedings in this Court. FMC cannot 
claim they are not — that they can only rely on 
one order of the Court and one letter from the 
receiver, because everything else is very clear 
the other way." 
(T. July 3, 1974, p.539, lines 14-30, p.54 line 1) 
"Mr. Gilbert and Mr. Roberts both said that they 
intended that the letter was the basis for negotia-
tion. (T. July 3, 1974, p.55) (Emphasis added.) 
To the same effect is the testimony at T. July 3, 1974, 
p.14 line 14: 
"MR. MARTINEAU: I will further testify 
that at no time have I advised my client that FMC 
had a contract. I have never been advised by any-
one that any offer of FMC has been accepted. 
My conversations with Mr. Roberts were always 
to the effect that a definitive contract would be 
presented to this Court and approved before any 
party would be bound." 
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In a "KULING" dated July 29, 1974 the Court, in 
direct contravention of its own specific assurance to the 
owners and their counsel, that if a settlement were achiev-
ed it would be honored and the receivership would be 
terminated, and contrary to the understanding of the 
owners and their counsel as well as the Receiver and his 
counsel, that the FMC letter offer had been approved 
merely as the basis for negotiations, which understand-
ing was specifically and expressly confirmed by the Court 
at the hearing on March 15,1974, and in disregard of the 
tremendous time, effort and expense incurred by the 
owners in achieving a settlement which had been there-
tofore consistently and forcefully urged by the Court 
with the specific assurance that it would be honored, and 
in disregard also of the fact that the settlement was con-
ditioned wholly as to its validity upon its approval by 
the Court, and notwithstanding the numerous substantial 
additions made in the contract as presented to the Court 
for approval and its readily apparent incompleteness, 
the Court granted the Receiver's Motion dated May 11, 
1974. (R. 396-399) The owners' serious objections to 
the contract as proposed were never even counsidered 
by the Court. 
This appeal, joined in by both Shaw and Robison, 
is from that ruling. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING THE RECEIVER'S MOTION TO AU-
THORIZE EXECUTION OF SALES CON-
TRACT.. 
A. In order for the proposed contract of sale to be 
in any respect binding or effective it required the fur-
ther specific approval of the Lower Court. 
It is well established that the appointment of a re-
ceiver is an equitable function. 19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corpora-
tions, % 1610, p.970. Where not provided by statute, as 
in Utah, a receiver's sale is a judicial sale which rests 
upon and is governed by orders of the court decreeing 
the sale. 
"[J]udicial sales, unless defined or regulated by 
statute, rest upon and are governed by the order 
of the court decreeing the sale. In a judicial sale 
the court makes its own law of the sale, subject 
only to the use of sound discretion in the exercise 
of the power." Chapman v. Schiller, 95 Utah 514, 
83 P.2d 249, 251 (1938). 
It is a further well-established rule that 
"[A] judicial sale must ordinarily be reported 
to and confirmed by the court which ordered it." 
47 Am. Jur. 2d, Judicial Sales, § 2, p.301. 
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A bid at a judicial sale 
"remains merely an offer to purchase umtil it is 
accepted and confirmed by the Court." 
and the purchaser 
"bids with full notice that the sale to him is sub-
ject to judicial confirmation, that the Court has 
the duty to exercise its discretionary power to 
confirm so m to secure to the owner of the pro-
perty the largest practical return, and that the 
purchasers rights are subject to the rational exer-
cise of such discretion" 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Judicial 
Sales § 136, p.407. (Emphasis added.) 
It is also stated: 
"It is generally regarded as essential to the com-
pletion of a judicial sale . . . to obtain final (ju-
dicial) confirmation." 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judicial 
Sales, § 2b, p. 612-613: 
The well-established rule, that not only acceptance 
by the Court but confirmation as well are required to 
bind the Court, is stated as follows in 50 C.J.S., Judicial 
Sales A 25, p. 612-613: 
"Since confirmation is the formal expression 
of the judicial sanction of the sale, it is generally 
essential to completion of a judicial sale. The 
sale, however, is not a nullity until such confirma-
tion. 
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Confirmation is the formal expression of the 
judicial sanction of the sale by which the court 
makes the sale its own, and an order of confirma-
tion is a judicial, and not a ministerial, act. It has 
been held that confirmation is not the sale, but 
only an approval of something already done. 
Since before confirmation the sale is a sale 
only in the popular, and not in a technical and 
legal sense, and the accepted bidder is merely a 
preferred purchaser, as discussed supra § 22, con-
firmation is necessary in order to complete the 
sale, and in order to divest the former owner's 
title and render valid the deed to the purchaser, 
whether the sale is public or private." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Confirmation may be refused where the sale will work 
an injustice to the parties. 
"[T]he simple fact that confirmation would sac-
rifice the interests of those entitled to the pro-
tection of the court is sufficient ground for a re-
fusal to confirm. . . . " 
"Particular grounds for refusing to confirm 
include: . . . mistake, misunderstanding or mis-
representation as to the terms or manner of sale. 
. . . " 50 C. J.S., Judicial Sales, § 28, p.620. 
Accordingly, the successful bidder at a judicial sale prior 
to confirmation of the sale occupies merely the position 
of the preferred purchaser, and has no rights substan-
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tial enough to require that judicial confirmation be given 
if there are legal or equitable reasons why it should not 
owur. 50 C.J.S., Judicial Sales, § 22, p,606-607; J. S. 
Sugarman Company v. Davis, 203 F.2d 931, 933-934 (10th 
Cir. 1953). Also as noted in 2 Clark on Beceivers § 519 
at 835: 
"It has been held that a bidder at a receiver 
sale acquires no enforceable rights until his bid 
is accepted by the court." 
If the nature of the judicial sale is such that a con-
tract is necessary a judicial sale is not complete until 
the bid and contract made in consequence thereof are 
confirmed by the Court, 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers, § 
106, p. 397. The definite rule that the judicial sale is not 
complete until the Court confirms the actual contract of 
sale is necessary and salutary rule in order for the Court 
to be assured that the contract fairly and adequately re-
flects the terms of the bid and properly protects the in-
terests of the owner of the property being sold by the 
Court. Additionally where multiple parties are inter-
ested in property subject to a judicial sale it is within 
the Court's discretion to grant rights to exclusive nego-
tiation and the opportunity to proceed to negatiate a 
contract with the Keceiver, but subject to obtaining final 
judicial confirmation. 
Both of the owners and their counsel understand and 
believed throughout the proceedings until July, 1974, as 
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did the Receiver and his counsel, that at every stage of 
the receivership the Lower Court had acted and was act-
ing within the rules set out above. They had every rea-
son to believe, and did believe, that consistent with the 
foregoing rules, the Lower Court was proceeding in a 
manner so as to permit an alternative approach to a 
proper disposition of the dispute. On the one hand, it 
appointed the Receiver to manage the business and solicit 
bids from prospective buyers. On the other hand, it gave 
forceful encouragement to the parties to settle so that 
a sale would be unnecessary. This dual approach to a 
resolution of the problem is consistent with all actions 
taken by the owners, thei rcounsel, the Receiver and his 
counsel, and by the Court itself throughout the proceed-
ings until July, 1974. 
In requesting that the Receiver be appointed, counsel 
specifically advised the Court that the appointment was 
required in order to permit either (1) a settlement be-
tween the owners, or (2) a sale in liquidation. (T. Aug. 
31, 1973, p.22 line 2). And it would be difficult to ex-
press a more definite assurance, that upon settlement the 
case would be dismissed, than that given to the owners 
by the Court immediately following appointment of the 
Receiver. 
"MR. STOTT: . . . In the event the agree-
ment is arrived at between the parties in this mat-
ter as to the sale or purchase of the corporation, 
I suppose at that time the receiver would be dis-
solved and we would have no problems as far as— 
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THE COURT: Not only would you have no 
problem, but the Court would be more than happy 
to entertain that petition. . . . 
MR. STOTT: I assumed that was the case." 
(T. Sept. 6, 1973, p.76 line 15) 
In subsequent contracts with the Court and with the 
Receiver and his counsel, the understanding that both a 
sale of the business and a settlement by the owners were 
being alternatively pursued was reinforced. For ex-
ample, on January 24, 1974 the Receiver reported to 
the Court his progress in locating a buyer for KOVO and 
indicated that he would present the offers to the Court 
and "seek approval from theCourt at that time (follow-
ing presentation and evaluation of the offers) to proceed 
with further negotiations and a final contract. . . . " (T. 
Jan. 24, 1974, p.4 line 14) (Emphasis added). This re-
port is consistent with the understanding that any final 
contract would have to be presented to the Court for ap-
proval and confirmation. 
Similarly on January 31, 1974, the Receiver moved 
"for order of the court respecting sale of the corporate 
assets," and prayed that a hearing be held to receive 
evidence with respect to the highest and best offer re-
ceived as of the date of the hearing. The Receiver in 
his Motion further requested that, following the hearing, 
the Court issue an order: 
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" . . . authorizing the receiver to negotiate 
and execute an appropriate contract of sale of the 
corporate assets in accordance with the provisions 
of Utah Code Annotated, § 16-10-93. (R. 151) 
(Emphasis added.) 
This Motion also is consistent with the understanding 
of the owners, their counsel and the Receiver that the 
letter offer of FMC would be accepted merely as the 
basis for negotiation of a final contract which would 
then be presented to the Court for approval and con-
firmation. 
Again, at the hearing held pursuant to the Receiver's 
request, on February 6, 1974, at which representatives 
of >the Intervenor were present, counsel for the Receiver 
explained that the purpose of the hearing was to present 
the Court with the best offers: 
"[F]or the purpose of having the court deter-
mine which of these constitutes the highest and 
best offer, and then requesting the court to au-
thorize the receiver to proceed to negatiate a firm 
and binding contract of sale with the offeror who 
has presented the highest and best offer." (T. 
Feb. 6, 1974, p,2 line 7) (Emphasis added.) 
Certainly at that time the Receiver's counsel contem-
plated, not that the FMC letter offer as such would be 
accepted and confirmed by the Court, but that it would 
upon acceptance be merely the basis for the negotiation 
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of a detailed final contract which only upon further ap-
proval and confirmation by the Court would become bind-
ing upon the Court, and parties or KOVO. 
The Intervenor is, of course, charged with know-
ledge of the pleadings, notices, etc. filed with the Court 
and with matters developed at hearings before the Court. 
With even more justification, the Intervenor is charged 
with knowledge of matters developed in hearings at 
which it was represented and matters developed in plead-
ings and in hearings after it entered into the picture. 
Thus it cannot now claim that it was not aware of the 
strenuous efforts of the Court to encourage settlement 
or the fact that from the orders, motions and discussions 
referred to above the parties as well as the Receiver and 
his counsel reasonably understood that the FMC letter 
was, if accepted, to be used merely as the basis for ne-
gotiation and that a final contract would have to be given 
further approval and confirmation by the Court to be 
binding. 
FMC's counsel was present when the Court on Feb-
ruary 6, 1974, for the umpteenth time restated his strong 
view that the parties should, if possible, settle the case 
so as to make unnecessary the intervention of the Court 
to liquidate the corporation. The Court stated: 
"[T]he one (thing) that would make me the most 
happy (is) for the shareholders to agree on some-
thing." 
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"[I] would be most happy if a modus operandi 
could be worked out or a proposal acceptable to 
all parties could be arrived at without the interest 
of the Court. 
MR. ROBERTS: I would be most pleased if 
we could do that, Your Honor." (T. Feb. 6, 1974, 
p.3-4, line 18) 
THE COURT: My concern is to try to see 
to it that . . . the offer . . . will be . . . acceptable 
to (the owners). You understand this is not a 
liquidation receivership. 
MR. HARDY: I understand." (T. Feb. 6, 
1974, p.10 line 21) 
Following the hearing and submission to the Court 
of a report of the Receiver, in which the Receiver recom-
mended the less desirable Intervenor offer over the other 
offers, primarily as a matter of fairness to the owners, 
the Court entered an order dated February 22,1974 that: 
"[T]he report and recommendation of the 
receiver be accepted by the court and filed in this 
proceeding and that the receiver proceed to ac-
cept the offer of F.M.C. and proceed with all rea-
sonable dispatch to conclude a sale to that of-
feror." (R. 173) (Emphasis added.) 
This order, which the Court later erroneously found 
constituted acceptance of the FMC offer clearly was no 
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such thing. It merely accepts the report of the Receiver 
and instructs him to proceed toward a binding accept-
ance. 
The letter dated February 27, 1974 to counsel for 
the Intervener from counsel for the Receiver advised 
that the Lower Court had approved the Receiver's re-
commendation which was to approve the FMC offer as 
the basis for further negotiations in order to finalize a 
contract which could then be submitted to the Court for 
approval and confirmation and requested from the In-
tervener "the draft contract so that we may proceed as 
soon as possible to negotiate all final terms and finalize 
the matter." (R. 314) (Emphasis added.) 
Copies of this letter were not sent to the co-owners 
or their counsel. 
On March 15, 1974 the Lower Court considered ob-
jections to its order of February 22nd filed by Robison 
and in its order overruling said objections the Lower 
Court stated: 
"(1) It is hereby ordered that the objections 
of Ashley L. Robison to the order of this court 
authorizing the receiver to proceed to negotiate 
a sale with FMC Corporation are hereby over-
ruled and denied." (R. 182) (Emphasis added.) 
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At the March 15th hearing the Court expressly ad-
vised those present that he had not approved any sale 
to the Intervenor and that he had only approved Inter-
vener's offer as a basis for negotiation. 
The settlement negotiations by the owner are them-
selves further evidence of their understanding, consistent 
with all of the foregoing, that a settlement between them 
would be honored by the Court if achieved before any 
final contract was submitted to the Court for approval 
and confirmation. Otherwise, on what basis and for what 
reasons would they be negotiating? Without the busi-
ness to buy or sell there would be virtually nothing to 
negotiate or settle upon. 
The settlement which should have been approved 
by the Lower Court resolves not only the issues which 
required the appointment of the Receiver but also all 
other issues and claims between the owners as well, in-
cluding the very difficult and potentially time-consuming 
accounting claims between the owners, claims with re-
spect to ownership and management of KOVO and other 
serious and substantial claims among and between the 
owners. Settlement reached by the owners, moreover, 
was far superior from a financial standpoint, for both 
owners than sale to the Intervenor could possibly have 
been. The offer submitted by Intervenor was, at best, 
at distress prices as would be expected. 
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On May 11, 1974 the Receiver petitioned the Court 
for its order to authorize execution of a sales contract. 
In making its motion the Receiver clearly acknowledged 
his understanding, again consistent with all of the fore-
going, that there was then no binding contract with the 
Intervenor and requested "that the court enter its order 
approving the execution of the document by the receiver 
in a manner which is binding upon KOVO, Inc." (R. 
186-187) (Emphasis added) Serious negotiations by 
the owners toward settlement were well advanced before 
they were aware of the Receiver's motion, as is noted 
in the Statement of Facts, above. Both the Court and 
Receiver's counsel were advised that serious negotiations 
were proceeding with some reasonable chance of success 
at least two weeks before the hearing on the Receiver's 
motion for approval. The owner's motion to terminate 
the receivership was also filed prior to the hearing on 
the Receiver's motion. 
Ignoring all of the foregoing background, and in di-
rect contradiction of his own encouragement of settle-
ment and his direct, consistent and explicit assurances 
that such a settlement would be honored, the Court in 
its RULING dated July 29, 1974 concluded that Inter-
venor had acquired vested rights on February 22, 1974 
and therefore directed the Receiver to proceed to con-
clude the sale. (R. 396-399) The Court's Ruling in favor 
of the Intervenor totally ignores the rights and interests 
of the owners, whose property is under the total control 
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and mercy of the Court, and whose interests it was the 
Court's primary duty to protect. Instead the ruling 
favors the rights and interests of the Intervenor, who 
was charged with knowledge of 'the reasonable, but ap-
parently misplaced, reliance of the owners and the Re-
ceiver upon the specific prior encouragement and assur-
ances of the Court. 
As is clearly demonstrated from the references to 
the record set forth above and in the Statement of Facts, 
the Court initially established a procedure, consistently 
followed and relied upon thereafter by the owners and 
the Receiver, whereby it was understood 'that the judicial 
sale would not be complete or binding until the final con-
tract of sale was approved. Clearly indicated in the mo-
tions made by the Receiver, and relied upon by the 
owners, is the fact that to be binding the final contract 
had still to be confirmed at the time the owners moved 
the Lower Court for its order terminating the receiver-
ship. 
It is incredible, and indeed shocking, that the Lower 
Court would conclude as it did that FMC acquired vested 
and binding contract rights by virtue of its order dated 
February 22, 1974 in disregard of its continuing and ex-
plicit encouragement, given in the presence of FMC's 
counsel, to the parties to continue their settlement efforts 
at the hearing on February 6, 1974. It is even more in-
credible and shocking in view of the Court's specific 
representation at the March 15 hearing that no such con-
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tract rights had been given and its continuing encourage-
ment of settlement thereafter. In explanation, the Court 
by July, 1974 had, perhaps understandably, forgotten the 
encouragement and the assurances shown in the record 
and relied upon by the parties. The transcript reviewing 
these assurances was not before the Court to be con-
sidered in connection with its decision, because no tran-
script had then been prepared. 
Although the integrity of dealings between the Court 
and third parties must be carefully preserved, as the 
Court suggests in its EULING dated July 29, 1974 (E, 
396-399), the dealings between the Court and counsel, 
and between the Court and parties who repose their 
property and confidence with the Court and who rely 
upon the Court's specific assurances and act thereon, 
must be even more closely preserved. This is especially 
true in this case where the third party is charged with 
actual knowledge of the Court's encouragement of settle-
ment and with at least constructive notice of pleadings 
filed with the Court and proceedings held in the Court, 
all relied upon by the owners, thereafter. To accept the 
result of the Court's EULING of July 29, 1974 in this 
case would make a mockery and a farce of the prolonged, 
difficult, time-consuming efforts of the parties to achieve 
a settlement they believed they had every right as well 
as full encouragement to make. They were never advised 
and had no reason to believe their rights had been di-
vested or that they should cease, or even slacken, their 
settlement efforts. 
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The specific language of the Court's order dated 
February 22, 1974 and the Receiver's letter to FMC's 
counsel dated February 27, 1974, even absent the back-
ground of preceding and following events, is at the most 
uncertain. In the context of pleadings, hearings, discus-
sions and conduct of the parties, however, there should 
be no doubt that they do not create a contract or give 
FMC any binding rights. Yet the Lower Court, surpris-
ingly, resolved the matter against the owners. 
In view of the extended dealings between the Court 
and the owners, and their clear, good-faith and full re^ 
liance upon the Court's wishes and its assurances, it is 
especially important that their rights and interests be 
recognized and protected. Otherwise the high confidence 
reposed in the Court by counsel and by the parties in 
litigation is seriously and irreparably eroded and justice 
severely suffers. The Lower Court must protect and give 
primary consideration to the interests and rights of 
parties who come before it for assistance. 
B. Intervenor had notice of the Receiver's limited 
authority and acquired no vested rights. 
A receiver is an agent of the Court and all persons 
dealing with the receiver are chargeable with knowledge 
of the receiver's authority to act or contract. 2 Clark 
on Receivers, § 433, p.277. This rule is fundamental and 
necessary to permit effective judicial sales and the law 
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is well established that persons dealing with a receiver 
do so at their peril. 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers, § 188 p.20 
Also, it is well established that the receiver has no im-
plied power to contract merely because he is a receiver 
but rather a receiver must be empowered <to act by order 
of the appointing court. 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers, § 
236, p.57. As noted in 3 Clark on Receivers, § 765, p.1418: 
"An equity receiver has only such powers as 
are granted by the order appointing the receiver 
or subsequent orders of the court appointed the 
receiver and those powers granted by the usages 
and rules of equity." 
Here there can be no question that the Intervenor 
must be charged with constructive notice of the Re-
ceiver's limited authority and his lack of authority to 
make a binding contract for sale without further ap-
proval of the Court. Further there should be little ques-
tion, in light of the representations made by the Court, 
that the orders signed by it were not sufficient to result 
in a binding contract as of February, 1974. Certainly 
there could have been no binding contract at the time the 
owners moved to terminate the receivership. That mo-
tion, therefore, should have been granted. For the fore-
going reasons it is evident that Intervenor's arguments 
concerning reliance and/or promissory estoppel are 
wholly without merit. 
The Lower Court's conclusion that Intervenor ac-
quired vested rights and a "binding, lawful and forceable 
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contract" by virtue of the Court's order of February 
22, 1974 is simply contrary to the facts, as noted above. 
The status of a bidder at a judicial sale between, the 
time his bid is accepted by a receiver and confirmed by 
the Court appointing the receiver was explained by 
Judge Learned Hand in Freehill v. Greenfield, 204 F.2d 
907, 908, 909 (2nd Cir. 1953): 
"The court was plainly right that an accepted 
bid at a judicial sale, subject to confirmation, 
binds the bidder, though it does not bind the court. 
It is to be considered as a contract concluded be-
tween the parties but subject to the consent of 
the third person; indeed, it would otherwise be 
difficult to conduct judicial sales at all." (Em-
phasis added) 
And in Morris v. Burnett, 154 F. 617, 624 (8th Cir. 
1907), the rights of a bidder before confirmation were 
further explained: 
"[T]here is a marked and radical distinction 
between the situations, the rights of the parties, 
and the established practice before and after the 
confirmation of sale. The purchaser bids with full 
notice that the sale to him is subject to confirma-
tion by the court and that there is power granted 
and a duty imposed upon the judicial tribunal 
when it comes to decide whether or not the sale 
shall be confirmed to so exercise its judicial power 
as to secure for the owners of the property the 
largest practical returns. He is aware that his 
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rights as a purchaser are subject to the rational 
exercise of this discretion. But after the sale was 
confirmed that discretion has been exercised. The 
power to sell and the power to determine the price 
at which the sale shall be made has been ex-
hausted. From thenceforth the court and the suc-
cessful bidder occupy the relation of vendor and 
purchaser in an executed sale . . . " (Emphasis 
added) 
And as noted in 2 Clark on Receivers, § 519 at 835, a 
bidder at a receiver's sale acquired no enforceable right 
until his bid has been accepted by the Court. And as is 
explained in 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Judicial Sales, § 179 at 441: 
" . . . no purchaser has the right to rely ab-
solutely upon the order of the court directing the 
sale and the fact the agent of the court has pur-
sued the terms prescribed thereby. 
Thus it is evident that a purchaser at a judicial sale 
before confirmation of the bid by the court has full notice 
that his bid may not be accepted and is not entitled to 
rely in any respect upon the simple fact that receiver 
has looked with favor upon his bid. 
The exact status and rights of a bidder after con-
firmation by the court is explained in 50 C. J.S., Judicial 
Sales, § 22 at pp.606, 607: 
"The bidder does not acquire any rights by 
his bid until it is accepted and the sale is con-
firmed by the court. Until a sale is reported to, 
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and confirmed by, the court, the bid remains an 
offer, there is no binding contract, the sale is not 
complete, and there is no sale in a legal, but only 
in a popular sense. This is true even in respect 
to a bid which has been accepted by the officer 
conducting the sale, and accepted bidder in such 
case being considered only a preferred proposer 
or purchaser and the accepted bid being deemed 
merely the best offer obtainable by the officer." 
(Emphasis added) 
Accordingly a bid accepted by the receiver does not 
arise to the status of a vested right which would pre-
clude a court from denying, in the exercise of its discre-
tion, the confirmation of the sale to the bidder. In this 
case the Receiver never intended to accept the bid with-
out further approval of the Court. 
This rule is the well-recognized law in Utah. In 
Joseph Nelson Plumbing & Keating Supply Co. v. Mc-
Crea, 64 Utah 484, 231 P. 823 (1924) this Court refused 
to confirm the Lower Court's judicial sale because of a 
misunderstanding. This decision was explained in Atwood 
v. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 55 P.2d 377, 388, (1936) as standing 
for the proposition that the court has wide discretion to 
set aside a receiver's sale. These cases show that a 
bidder, prior to confirmation, has no right which should 
interfere with the court exercising its best judgment in 
the interest of the parties affected by the sale. Conse-
quently, the Intervenor's protracted argument to the 
Lower Court about the expenditures it made in reliance 
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upon the Receiver's approval of its bid and attempts to 
utilize the doctrine of promissory estoppel are completely 
without merit. Adopting the Intervener's position would 
preclude courts from conducting effective judicial sales. 
In any event, the very substantial effort, time, and ex-
pense incurred by the owners over a prolonged period 
to work out a very difficult settlement at the Court's 
request merit much greater consideration than the un-
solicited efforts and expense by the Intervenor. At the 
time the owners settled their differences the only interest 
the Intervenor had in the proceedings was the exclusive 
right to negotiate with the Eeceiver. This is buttressed 
by the Court's representations at the March 15, 1974 
hearing that no contract rights had been given the In-
tervenor and is further supported by the request of the 
Eeceiver in May, that the Court approve a contract of 
sale to the Intervenor "in a manner which is binding 
upon KOVO." (E, 187) Clearly, the Lower Court erred 
in determining that Intervenor acquired vested rights 
in February, 1974 which precluded the Court from ex-
ercising its sound discretion to terminate the receiver-
ship as it had promised it would of the owner could settle 
these differences. 
POINT II 
THE CONTRACT OF SALE PROPOSED BY 
THE INVEEVENOE WAS MATERIALLY 
DIFFERENT FROM ITS BID AND SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY THE 
LOWER COURT. 
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As is readily apparent from a comparison of the 
initial letter offer of FMC (B. 141-144) and the detailed 
contract submitted to the Court for approval (E. 189-
259) the changes between the two are not only numerous 
but in a number of important respects very substantial. 
For example, the new paragraph on "definitions" neces-
sarily includes in the sale certain assets such as files, 
records, books or account the logs nowhere included in the 
letter offer. This same section requires that KOVO 
recognize as valid financial and other reports not men-
tioned in the offer. 
Of much greater significance is the provision in 
paragraph 4(b) at page 7 of the Agreement which re-
quires that $75,000.00 be placed in escrow against war-
ranties. Although no escrow agreement accompanied the 
letter offer and none was prepared to accompany the 
Agreement submitted to the Court, a form of Escrow 
Agreement not furnished to counsel for the owners or 
to the Court, apparently prepared in March, 1974, re-
quires the escrow agent to hold the funds for a period 
of two years after closing and the closing itself according 
to the Agreement is from 5-15 days after FCC approval 
which generally takes from 4-6 months. Although the 
letter offer merely conditions payment of the purchase 
price upon conveyance of the assets, the Agreement adds 
the condition of "performance" by KOVO as well before 
any of the proceeds are payable. Thus it would be at 
least two years after the closing which would be some 4-6 
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months after this appeal is determined before Mr. Shaw 
or Mr. Robison would have this very substantial portion 
of the net proceeds of sale so as to be able to get into 
another business. Yet they would be liable to pay taxes 
on the entire transaction since it would not qualify as 
an installment sale but would be without any funds to 
meet that obligation. In the meantime, by terms of the 
Escrow Agreement FMC would receive all interest and 
earnings on both the $25,000.00 deposit and the $75,000.00 
indemnity amount. The hardship and loss upon Mr. 
Shaw and Mr. Robison and the substantial benefit to 
FMC of this arrangement are obvious. That this con-
stitutes a clear, substantial and totally new element in 
comparison with the original letter offer cannot be seri-
ously disputed. Nor can it be disputed that the escrow 
requirements clearly demonstrate that the agreement 
the court purported to approve does not fairly and pro-
perly protect the rights of the owner. 
Another new provision involves trade-out accounts 
which FMC's action mayaffect. Also, the tax conce-
its shareholders with an unknown liability and subject 
to claims being made. 
As noted, the Agreement provides for a cumbersome 
indemnification process for the protection of FMC 
whereby FMC is to be indemnified out of the $75,000.00 
escrow fund set up for that purpose. 
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Many new burdensome warranties are provided for 
in the Agreement, which are in addition to the standard 
warranties. 
Many new conditions to the contract closing are im-
posed by FMC's proposed contract where were not con-
tained in the prior letter offer. 
The Agreement also provides that KOVO must war-
rant that there are no brokerage commissions to be 
charged as a result of the sale, and further, that FMC 
may terminate the Agreement, once executed, if the FCC 
has not "finally approved" the transfer by July 31, 1975 
or if for some reason the station's broadcasts are inter-
rupted for a period in excess of 30 days. These pro-
visions were not in the letter offer. 
Finally, the Agreement provides that the rights 
created thereunder are assignable by FMC, but implies 
that KOVO may assign neither its rights or obligations 
under the Agreement. 
The net effect of these many changes added to the 
Agreement which were not present in the offer is to sub-
stantially increase the burdens of KOVO and to sub-
stantially decrease the obligations of FMC. Many pro-
visions have been added which would allow FMC to either 
terminate the contract, once executed, or to renege on 
the deal. Furthermore, the warranty provisions which 
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have been added are so encompassing that KOVO as-
sumes all the risks, even in areas of business dealing 
which FMC's actions may effect. Also, the tax conse-
quences to the principals have as noted above been ser-
iously changed. They could, in fact, bring the owners 
close to bankruptcy. 
Because of the many substantial and important 
changes in and incompleteness of the contract submitted 
to the Lower Court it should have been disapproved and 
rejected, even if a binding contract had in fact been made 
in February, 1974. 
The many changes demonstrated not only the need 
to reject the contract as presented to the Court but the 
sound reasons underlying the rule which requires speci-
fic confirmation by the Court of any final contract before 
any vested rights accrue to the buyer and, more impor-
tantly, before any of the owners' rights are divested. 
CONCLUSION 
It is important to note in conclusion, as heretofore 
pointed out to the Court, that (1) the primary purpose 
of the receivership is to protect the interests of the cor-
poration and its shareholders whose property the Court 
has under its control; (2) the policy of the law is and 
must be to encourage and facilitate the settlement of dis-
putes at every stage of a proceeding, including a receiver-
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ship proceeding; (3) consistent with such a policy the 
Lower Court consistently and forcefully encouraged the 
parties here to work out a settlement which they have 
done; (4) the Lower Court specifically assured the own-
ers that it would honor a settlement between them and 
the Lower Court expressly advised all parties that no 
vested rights had been granted; (5) a third party dealing 
with a Receiver and the Court in this context must act 
at his peril and he may not presume that he has a binding 
contract, when not only the Court record but the clear 
conduct and understanding of the parties and the Re-
ceiver and their counsel and the documents theretofore 
and thereafter prepared by the Receiver's counsel and 
by FMC itself are inconsistent with that position, in that 
they contemplate further court approval; (6) the good-
faith reliance of parties before the Court in the conduct 
and assurances given by the Court must be honored and 
recognized, and (7) the best interests of the corporation 
and its shareholders are clearly best served by the settle-
ment with which they all agree and which conclude all of 
the other difficult and substantial and issues between the 
parties as well. 
The Motion of the Receiver for approval of the 
Agreement, as to which the Receiver and its counsel took 
no position, should have been denied and the Motion of 
the parties for dismissal of the receivership action, sub-
ject of course to proper safeguards and conditions, should 
have been granted. 
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In the alternative this Court should at the very mini-
mum remand this case to the Lower Court with instruc-
tions that it scrutinize with care all provisions of any 
contract which it may hereafter approve to insure not 
only fair consistency with the initial FMC offer but ade-
quate protection for the rights and interests of the own-
ers and KOVO as well. 
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